Islamists after the Arab Uprisings

Hamas and Hezbollah in warscapes, Al-Azhar, post-Salafism, Islamist effects on elections, and more in this week's MENA Academy roundup.

Ahmed al-Tayeb, Grand Iman of al-Azhar, welcoming Mohamed Khalifa Al Mubarak, President of the Abrahimic Family House. Source: Abrahamic Family House, Twitter.

This week’s MENA Academy roundup focuses on new scholarship on Islamism, just because there’s so much just published on the topic worth spotlighting. I’ll have more soon on the many other issues of the day, including Israel’s war on Gaza and Lebanon, and its expected attack on Iran. I’ll also have another MENA Academy roundup soon on issues not related to Islamism, along with news of some new and forthcoming publications. So stay tuned.

I recently blogged about a special issue that I produced along with my co-authors Jeroen Gunning and Morten Valbjørn on armed Islamist actors in protracted warscapes. We were especially interested in whether Islamist groups responded differently than non-Islamist groups to the strategic environment, and whether Sunni and Shi’a Islamists differed from each other. We didn’t include extended discussion of Hamas or Hezbullah in that special issue, in part because those two groups were far more institutionalized and involved in governance than the more fluid and societally-based armed groups emerging and evolving within conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq (where are authors mostly focused). But even as they evolved into state-like actors in terms of governance, capabilities, and organization, Hamas and Hezbollah do fit interestingly into the framework of Islamist adapation to the warscape, having been adapting highly successfully to the most prototypical and enduring of the world’s warscapes for decades.

I’d encourage interested readers to check out our framing essay, which walks through the ways and levels by which Islamist actors may have advantages or disadvantages relative to non-religious groups in contexts of protracted conflict without clear beginning or ending. From this perspective, Hamas and Hezbollah seem rather likely to survive even the extreme decapitation strikes (killing not just Sinwar and Nasrallah but large numbers of immediate subordinates and potential successors) and massive damage inflicted by Israel on their populations and environments — but also to evolve rapidly in response to the disruption of both internal institutionalization and strategic environment in ways which could make their behavior less predictable and more violent as new leaders struggle to consolidate power (recent GWU PhD student Mark Berlin’s dissertation and forthcoming publications are very interesting on this).

But there’s more to Islamism than Hamas and Hezbollah. This week’s MENA Academy roundup begins with two special issues. First, Thèo Blanc and Olivier Roy have produced a fascinating collection in Mediterranean Politics on post-Salafism across a wide range of geographical and political contexts showing increasing localization and engagement by Salafist groups (a finding in line with our warscapes special issue’s observations about local context). Next, the journal Philosophy and Society (University of Belgrade) has just released a special issue on Islamism before and after the Arab uprisings which features strong work by a range of (mostly) Arab and European scholars.

We also have a number of standalone articles worth your time. First, two articles revolving around Egypt’s Al-Azhar: Ahmed Ezzedin Mohamed examines the relationship between state provided Islamic education and Islamism, particularly the case of al-Azhar, while Mohamed Mohamed focuses on al-Azhar’s role in the UAE’s soft power campaign across the region (the photo on this newsletter illustrates that cooperation). Next, a few articles focused on elections of various kinds: Yusuf Magiya and M. Tahir Kilavuz challenge assumptions about Islamist electoral advantages by looking at incumbents in Turkey; Margot Dazey and Peter Gay explore how visible Muslim presence in France impacts electoral support for far-right candidates; and Tomoya Chisaka offers an unusual look inside Iranian electoral manipulation.

Please check out all of these interesting contributions, with links and abstracts below, and I’ll be back soon with more!

Thèo Blanc and Olivier Roy, “Post-Salafism: From global to local Salafism,” Mediterranean Politics.” This special issue expands on the recent literature break with the globalist paradigm of Salafism studies to propose a shift to a ‘glocal’ or ‘translocal’ paradigm emphasizing the interplay between global pushes and local particularities. Based on an extensive literature review, this introduction proposes to (1) challenge the prevalent understanding of the global spread of Salafism as a Saudi-induced process; (2) to raise the question of Salafis’ integration in their respective national/local environment; and (3) to analyse the local as a space in its own right rather than as a mere receptacle of global fluxes. In contrast with the model of a globalized, ‘decultured’ Salafism, the SI contends that Salafism is now taking an opposite direction towards a threefold trend of ‘indigenization’, re-culturation, and politicization, which encompass an increasing embeddedness in local dynamics and the revision of exclusivist, isolationist, and non-participatory behaviours. The SI proposes a series of case-studies and cross-case comparisons both at the centre (France, Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria) and at the periphery of the Mediterranean region (Mauritania, Mali/Nigeria, Ethiopia, and far away Cambodia) with the intent of demonstrating that this trend is not confined to a specific geography but occurs in all Muslim communities, including Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. Through in-depth ethnographic and qualitative research, the authors observe a tendency towards the revision of Salafis’ exclusivist and rejectionist stance through a reinvention of its modes of engagement with society at the religious, political, and cultural levels, which marks an unprecedented rupture with ‘globalized’ Salafism. Special issue includes articles by, among others, Thèo Blanc and Guy Robert Eyre, “Post-salafism by learning: The indigenization of globalized, exclusivist Salafism in Tunisia and Morocco”; Ester Sigillò, “Salafis’ hybrid trajectories of socio-political engagement in Tunisia and Algeria. A social movement perspective”; Alexander Thurston, “Salafism and dialectics of Muslim identity in Nigeria and the Sahel”; and Mohamed-Ali Adraoui and Bernard Godard, “Salafism, neo-salafism, and post-salafism. Evolutions of a radical current of Islam in France.”

CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: MAPPING THE FIELD, Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society (University of Belgrade). Special Issue, featuring articles by (among many others) Mohammad Affan, “Revisiting Post-Islamism a Decade After the Arab Spring”, Imad Alsoos and Julius Dihstelhoff, “Ennahda’s Muslim Democracy in Post-Arab Spring Tunisia: Synthesizing Political Thought and Practice”, Mohammed Hashas, “Religion and Politics in Morocco: Islamic, Islamist, and Post-Islamist Dynamics”, and Sari Hanafi, “The Transformation of the Discourse on Secularism/the Civil State in Arab Academic Writings Post Arab Spring.”

Ahmed Ezzedin Mohamed, “Relationship between state-provided Islamic education and Islamism,” Politics and Religion (October 2024). ABSTRACT: This article examines the relationship between state-provided religious education and support for Islamists. It first provides a historical overview of this debate in the Egyptian context. It then examines a survey of young adults from post-Arab-Spring Egypt, the largest education market in the Middle East and North Africa region. The findings show that recipients of state-provided Islamic education, Azharites, are more likely to hold favorable views of Islamists. This is likely attributed to the ideological alignment between Azharites and Islamists, since both favor a bigger public role of religion and stricter adherence to conservative social norms. However, the analysis does not support the notion that Azharites view Islamists as competitors in the religious market for followers. These results inform policy debates on Islamic education in Muslim countries and illustrate the limitations of mass indoctrination in authoritarian settings.

Mohamed Mohamed, “Selling god: Al-Azhar, UAE and transnational transferability of religious capital,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (October 2024). ABSTRACT: The intersection between al-Azhar and global politics has been largely overlooked by scholars, creating a gap in the literature. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the relationship between al-Azhar and the dynamics of politics from a transnational lens, based on interviews with officials at al-Azhar Sheikhdom, Al-Azhar University, and Al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism. The study examines how the UAE has been instrumentalizing al-Azhar’s ‘religious capital’ to advance its foreign policy efforts against political Islam and position itself as a major advocate of ‘peace’ in the region. The paper argues that the Emirati instrumentalization of al-Azhar’s ‘religious capital’ has taken various forms, including appointing Imam al-Tayyeb as the chairman of the UAE-based Muslim Council of Elders, sponsoring the establishment of the Al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism and relying on Azharite Ulamā in its ‘peace-based’ initiatives, which have been at the forefront of Emirati foreign policy for over a decade. Moreover, the paper highlights the intricate reciprocity between al-Azhar and the UAE, manifested in substantial financial assistance and Grand Imam al-Tayyeb’s close rapport with the Emirati leadership, which has facilitated a partial reframing of the institutional relationship between al-Azhar and the Egyptian state.

Yusuf Magiya and M. Tahir Kilavuz, “When religion meets incumbency: The limits of Islamist electoral advantage,” Party Politics (October 2024). ABSTRACT: Why do religious-based parties in Muslim-majority contexts win when they run in elections as incumbents? Does Islamist advantage make them appealing to voters? The sources of Islamist advantage such as their organizations, services, images, and being a refuge are well-documented. However, the literature primarily focuses on contexts where religious-based parties compete under adverse conditions as opposition actors, rather than as incumbents facing more favorable conditions. Through an innovative conjoint experiment in Turkey using candidate videos, we explore the extent of Islamist advantage arguments. Our findings suggest that the universal Islamist advantage, by which Islamists appeal to broader segments, disappears under Islamist incumbency because Islamists can no longer appeal through those sources of Islamist advantage as incumbents. Instead, Islamists may still win due to two factors: incumbency advantage and a persisting particularistic Islamist advantage, driven by increasing spatial voting. Our findings provide evidence for a frequently proposed, yet unsubstantiated, claim about the extent of Islamist advantage.

Margot Dazey and Peter Gay, “The Mosque Nearby: Visible Minorities and Far-Right Support in France,” Comparative Political Studies (October 2024). ABSTRACT: How is support for right-wing populist parties affected by exposure to Muslim visibility? Using an original database on French mosques, this article analyzes the relationship between the presence of mosques and support for the Front National at the polling station level in the late 2000s. It finds that the propensity to vote for the Front National increases in polling stations up to intermediate distances from mosques and then decreases, suggesting a spatial mechanism known as the halo effect. The analysis also shows that larger mosques and those with minarets are associated with an accentuated halo effect, suggesting the importance of the salience of minority groups rather than their relative size in influencing political behavior.

Tomoya Chisaka, “The conflict within: the politics of parliamentary election management in Iran,” Democratization (October 2024). ABSTRACT: Scholars of comparative politics have long been interested in understanding conflicts that arise among elites within authoritarian contexts. Such conflicts are particularly puzzling when they occur in the context of authoritarian elections and within state administrative institutions like the electoral management body (EMB). Using previously unanalysed primary sources provided by Iran’s Ministry of Interior, which document the inner workings of Iran’s 2000 parliamentary election management, this study investigates intra-elite conflict associated with this important election. I found that within the dual EMB structure, where elected and unelected members coexist, elected administrative members can access information on irregular activities by unelected members more than those outside of this body. These information resources encourage elected members to take the risk of accusing more powerful elites – the unelected members of the regime – of electoral fraud. This is particularly evident during the reformist (moderate opposition) Presidency. My findings suggest the importance of examining intra-elite conflict within administrative institutions – EMBs – for a better understanding of political contestation within otherwise opaque authoritarian regimes.