Making the Gulf a Region

Plus Moroccan public opinion, legislation threatening universities, and a wealth of new journal articles in this week's MENA Academy roundup.

Welcome to another week of exciting scholarship in the field of Middle East and North African politics! Let’s jump right in with a fabulous new book, two important reports, and a veritable cornucopia of new journal articles.

Book of the week: Arang Keshavarzian, Making Space for the Gulf: Histories of Regionalism and the Middle East (Stanford University Press, 2024). This is a book I’ve been waiting for, and it doesn’t disappoint. A couple of years ago, I published a short piece in Foreign Affairs about the policy implications of our mental maps of “the Middle East” which never really matched reality and increasingly conceal more than they reveal. I have a short book hopefully coming out soon greatly expanding that idea, applying it across multiple domains of political science and policy. So I couldn’t have been more excited for Making Sense of the Gulf, a critical geopolitics account by Arang Keshavarsian of the emergence and implications of the concept of the Gulf as a security-infused geopolitical border area. Rather than taking today’s conflicts across the Gulf — Iran against Saudi Arabia — at face value, he examines the processes of regionalization themselves and treats “the Gulf” as an outcome of historical struggles rather than as their cause or their abstract location. Representations of the Gulf as a coherent whole, he insists (and I agree), are always incomplete and frustrated by their poor match with lived reality and clashes with competing projects.

Keshavarzian approaches the question of the emergence of the Gulf as region from multiple perspectives, putting historical, anthropological, urban politics and geopolitical lenses into a highly productive dialogue. He begins from the observation that the Gulf is not an abstract empty spot on the map but an actual physical thing with a textured topography which changes through natural processes like erosion and manmade construction. Throughout, he challenges geopolitical approaches which treat the Gulf as “a regional whole and uniform space that can and should be secured.” Instead, he sets out to recapture the many ways in which the Gulf, like all bodies of water, served as “a social bridge, not political boundary” which served to connect societies, empires, economies, and polities over the years. His descriptions of the oceanic world which the littoral coast of the Arabian peninsula inhabited connect “ports, wind-powered vessels, caravan routes, kinship ties, and credit lines” from India to the African coast.

The Gulf, in this vision, has been “both a center and an edge”, its place in the oceanic world evolving with the rise and contestation of empires. He traces the encroachment of the British Empire onto the Arabian coast, from the truncated sovereignty offered to its protectorates to its general indifference to what happened inland (all of which proved extremely beneficial to the shaykhs and families chosen as their local partners), and the effects of the global economy on the pearling and date industries and the slave trade. He then digs deep into its transition from a “British lake” to Cold War battlefield and American indirect imperium. Where Keshavarzian shines is in his ability to connect the geopolitical story to finely textured anthropological and historical accounts of the evolution of Gulf cities and port towns, showing the lived realities behind the abstractions. Drawing on a rich literature on migrant labor in the Gulf, he shows the long history of interactions among diverse cultures and communities without sugarcoating the realities of exclusions, marginalizations, and exploitation that divided them. His nuanced reading of the emergence of Free Trade Zones is fascinating, locating their development not in late 20th century neoliberalism but in an earlier era of truncated sovereignty.

Keshavarzian ends with several personal anecdotes of his observations of smugglers along the Araiban coast and with his experience of being barred from teaching at NYU Abu Dhabi by the UAE authorities. It’s a fitting way to wrap a kaleidoscope of a book, an intellectual tour de force which makes for a highly original and major addition to the rapidly growing literature on the Gulf. It’s one of my favorite books of the year thus far, and highly recommended.

Reports of the week: First, the peerless Arab Barometer recently released a report of the major findings of its most recent wave in Morocco. The Arab Barometer is such an important resource for all social scientists and policy makers, not only because of its methodological rigor (all interviews face to face with a well-developed sampling frame) but also because it makes all of its data openly available to researchers. Multiple waves allow for comparison and tracking of trends across time and between different Middle Eastern countries. This Morocco report really demonstrates all of those virtues. Among its key findings is the clear evidence of “two Moroccos: one for the wealthier and better educated, another for the poorer and less educated. Moroccans are clearly divided in their views of almost all issues based on their socioeconomic status (SES).” This class bifurcation aligns with trends across much of the region, and informs attitudes towards the government, corruption, the environment, and so much more. The survey finds that large majorities of Moroccans experience climate change as directly impacting their lives, and growing numbers report running out of money to buy food at least once a month. More than half of young Moroccans have thought emigrating, mostly for economic opportunities.

And, of course, they ask about Gaza: “When asked to define these events, Moroccans most commonly describe them as a massacre (26 per- cent), a war (24 percent), a genocide (14 percent), or a mass killing (14 percent).” Only 22% believe that Israel is committed to a two-state solution. Only 13% of Moroccans now favor normalization with Israel, down from 31% in 2022 — a twenty point swing which offers a rare quantification of the impact of Gaza on Arab public opinion.

Second, Maryam Jamshidi has released a preliminary overview of an extremely alarming trend in the escalating crackdown on the teaching and study of the Middle East in American higher education, “Securitizing the University”. Her overarching conclusions dovetails with mine: “If the securitization of the university becomes embedded in law, the long-term negative impacts will be substantial. It is not only pro-Palestinian activists who will be threatened by these efforts — though they will bear their immediate brunt — but also the cornerstones of university life, including the communal bonds that sustain university campuses, academic freedom, and the very nature of higher education itself.” What makes this report essential is that it digs deep into the legislation and practices which constitute that threat, bringing together disparate sources into a coherent picture. These are not abstract. She highlights Congressional legislation aimed at stripping universities of their nonprofit status, expanding Section 702 surveillance, expansion of no-fly lists and deportation, the redefinition of antisemitism, new interpretations of Title VI disciplinary actions, and more. Even people worried about the effects of the repression of Gaza protests are probably not aware of the full scope of what is coming down the pike; this report, and the larger projects from which it draws, should be front and center in changing that.

And finally, the journal articles

We’ve got a really rich batch this week, with two fascinating articles on Turkey, three on Tunisia, and two on Israel/Palestine. Enjoy!

Lisel Hintz and Harun Ercan, “Permissive prejudice in localized authoritarian consolidation: evidence from Turkey's municipalities,” Democratization (May 2024). ABSTRACT: What strategies do competitive authoritarian regimes use to target local-level opposition gains? How and why can these strategies vary subnationally? We analyse how national-level identity politics shapes regimes’ repression calculus at the local level. We suggest permissive prejudice leads regimes to choose harsher strategies in localities governed by stigmatized minority groups than in majority-led localities. To study this phenomenon, we identify three strategies varying in degrees of severity and visibility, and present an original dataset of repressive events in Turkey’s municipalities from 2016–2022. We argue anti-Kurdish prejudice explains the ruling AKP’s use of a harsh strategy of leader replacement in 149 cases of Kurdish-led municipalities yet only one Turkish-led municipality. Supporting our claim, the AKP used behind-the-scenes hamstringing to obstruct opposition mayors in Turkish-led municipalities. Our findings highlight the permissive and restrictive roles that identity politics plays in shaping local-level repression and wider patterns of authoritarian consolidation.

Sabine Henneberg, “Civil society’s development in Tunisia’s democratization process, 2011-2021,” Mediterranean Politics (June 2024). ABSTRACT: In the years following the 2011 overthrow of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the international democracy promotion community enthusiastically embraced Tunisia’s burgeoning civil society. Ten years later, however, when the democratically-elected president Kais Saied began to dismantle the country’s democratic institutions, civil society largely stood on the side-lines. This paper examines what happened during the intervening decade that left civil society’s international funders so disappointed. The paper finds that three key changes over time help explain the gap between donor expectations and what civil society ultimately delivered: the development of an antagonistic and uncooperative relationship between civil society and the state; differences between Tunisian civil society activists and international donors on the types of issues they prioritized and other matters; and an overall lack of trust and lack of cohesion among civil society activists in working towards common goals – despite some successful coalition work around particular legislation – which came on full display after July 2021. This paper contributes to studies of Tunisian civil society’s development process in the context of its transition experience between 2011 and 2021, and of how and why donors continue to ‘miss the mark’ in their efforts to support civil society as a means of promoting democracy.

Helen Murphey, “Who defines moderation? Adapting Islamist and Salafi identities in Tunisia to a changing religio-political field,” Mediterranean Politics (June 2024). ABSTRACT: The idea of Tunisian ‘moderation’ as an essential constituent part of national identity has been historically used by autocratic governments as an instrument of securitization, investing the state with the unique authority to suppress movements – in practice, usually the Islamist opposition – deemed antithetical to this identity and thus threatening to the nation and its people. This paper explores how, after the Arab Uprisings in 2010–2011, diverse groups of Islamists responded to pre-existing discourses of Tunisian national identity as moderate. After the revolution, Tunisian Islamists and Salafis initially both contested the assumptions behind pre-revolutionary conceptualizations of national identity that had previously excluded them from the boundaries of normative citizenship by reframing the nature of the threat or attempting to redefine and expand the nature of moderation. Both groups encountered different outcomes in their attempts to recalibrate the notions of identity, religion and the state. These divergences can be traced to their differing ideologies, political situations and incentives. Nevertheless, the fact that each group engaged with – rather than dismissed – this discourse suggests the centrality of the state-moderation-security nexus in structuring past and present conceptualizations of Tunisian moderation.

Anne Wolf, “How Erroneous Beliefs Trigger Authoritarian Collapse: The Case of Tunisia, January 14, 2011,” Comparative Political Studies (June 2024). ABSTRACT: Why was the longtime Tunisian ruler Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali ousted on January 14, 2011? Prevailing theories focus on popular mobilization, grievances, and the role of the army to explain the collapse of the authoritarian regime. I evaluate these arguments in light of new empirical evidence, which shows that they are insufficient to explain Ben Ali’s ousting. Analyzing key decisional moments and counterfactual scenarios, I propose that the regime collapsed because of a set of erroneous beliefs, which flourished amid the contingent revolutionary context. Erroneous beliefs are endogenous to highly contingent revolutionary periods and a potential contingency themselves in that they can change collective outcomes. This study shows how the microanalysis of events can furnish new insights into highly impactful events in history—the collapse of the Ben Ali regime gave rise to the wider Arab Uprisings—and topics of key concern to scholars of contentious politics, authoritarianism, and democratization.

Youssef Mnaili, “Does the Buck Stop Somewhere? Blame Games and State Capture in the Legalization of the Israeli Land Grab,” Politics and Society (June 2024). ABSTRACT: This article explores the intricate relationship between the Israeli state and Jewish settlers in the occupied Palestinian West Bank after the Oslo Accords (1993). It shows that, despite the accords, which prohibited the establishment of new settlements, such activities persisted. Instead, the accords triggered the seemingly spontaneous emergence of numerous illegal “hilltop settlements,” tolerated by higher echelons of government and actively supported by lower levels. These settlements subsequently underwent a gradual post hoc formalization process, ultimately leading to their full legalization. The article elucidates how a faction within Israeli society influenced segments of the government, employing blame games as a strategy to rationalize the legitimization of the Israeli land grab. Notably, it highlights the strategic and deceptive tactics employed by various Israeli governments in their dealings with the settler movement. The article concludes by reflecting on the political implications of the settler movement's success for the democratic character of the Israeli state.

Majd Abuamer, “Gaza’s Subterranean Warfare: Palestinian Resistance Tunnels vs. Israel’s Military Strategy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (May 2024). ABSTRACT: Actors with limited military capabilities resort to tunnel warfare to counterbalance military and technological disparities with the larger army. From the 1970s onward, tunnels have been used remarkably by non-state actors and liberation movements. Over the last two decades, Israel has set the destruction of the tunnels of the Palestinian armed groups as a primary goal of its massive wars in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Palestinian armed groups have strategically harnessed the subterranean realm, rendering it an operational tool and developing a tunnel system. This study explores the subterranean warfare in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, exploring the historical evolution of the Gaza tunnels, their effectiveness, types, and military uses. It also scrutinizes the Israeli military strategy toward these tunnels, examining the techniques employed for detection and destruction of these tunnels, along with their inherent limitations.