Welcome to another new feature on Abu Aardvark’s MENA Academy! Each week, I will invite a MENA scholar for an informal and informed conversation about something in the news relevant to their research, and share it with some light edits for clarity.

China’s President Xi Jinping arrives tomorrow in Riyadh for a multi-day China-Arab Summit meeting. At least fourteen Arab leaders are expected to attend, making this a major symbolic moment in the evolution of China’s place in the Middle East. A lot of commentary has framed this summit around the comparison with President Biden’s frosty reception in Saudi Arabia this summer. But I think there’s a lot more to it than that. I see this as another step in a long process of the Asianization of the Gulf, a process which does not necessarily require conflict with the United States but which is inexorably transforming the region and its place within global order. It’s Xi’s first visit to the Middle East since 2016, and expectations are reasonably high for what he’s looking for — and what Mohammed bin Salman is hoping for — in his attending the China-Arab Summit.

To get some insights into what to expect from the China-Arab Summit, I reached out to Jonathan Fulton of Zayd University in Abu Dhabi. Fulton is the editor of the Routledge Handbook of China-Middle East Relations, an encyclopedic overview of the relationship in all its aspects. He’s also the author of China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies (2020), and co-editor (with Li-Chin Sim) of the brand new open access collection Asian Perspectives of Gulf Security. He’s also the host of the Atlantic Council’s China-MENA Podcast, an invaluable resource for those of you who are into podcasts.

Abu Aardvark: You’ve been closely studying the evolving relationship between the Gulf and China for many years. Tomorrow, Saudi Arabia is hosting this big China-Arab summit. What’s going on? How significant is this, and what should we be looking for?

Jonathan Fulton: Well it’s not unprecedented but it is something new. China’s been holding this ongoing Arab state forum that convenes every two years, and they’ve been doing this since I think 2004. So that part isn’t new. And this summit, this year it’s happening right on schedule, but they are calling it something new.

But even if it’s not new in that sense, I think it’s important. Obviously we haven’t seen Xi Jinping doing a lot of international travel since COVID happened. He hasn’t been to the Middle East since 2016. I think it’s going to be a pretty significant trip.

How significant?

Well I don’t think he’s going to make that trip unless he has something big cooking. This is all speculative, but I’d expect them to announce a lot of big contracts for NEOM, that will be a big part of it. After the al-Ula summit that resolved the Qatar blockade last January, there was a lot of talk about interconnectivity among GCC countries so I’d expect there to be some new China projects, Belt and Road Initiative type things like maybe a land-bridge railroad.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a document for the trip, it’s called ‘China-Arab Cooperation in the New Era’, and there have been stories from some journalists in China and Hong Kong that got a sneak preview, so I guess we’re entering a new era and there will have to be some cooperation, so look for contracts and MOUs to kick it off.

One thing I have my eye on is that when Xi went to Riyadh in 2016 he said he really wanted to see this Free Trade Agreement that China and the GCC had been working on wrapped up in a year. They held four or five rounds of talks between 2016-17 and things were going well, but then the dispute with Qatar happened and, you know, you can’t really make a Free Trade Agreement with the GCC if the GCC isn’t working anymore. But after al-Ula the State Counselor Yang Jiechi went to Qatar and to Kuwait and he talked a lot about this. Foreign Minister Wang Yi also went to Qatar and they talked about the FTA there too. I’m not hearing anything about it yet, but then we aren’t really hearing anything about the agenda at all. So I’ll be watching that.

Is this the dawn of the post-American era and beginning of Chinese Middle East?

No.

That was fast (laughter). What is it then?

I think it’s the continuation of the more diverse Middle East that’s been evolving for years now. Obviously on the heels of Biden’s trip to Riyadh there’s the temptation to link the two, every few months I see a spate of headlines like ‘as the US pulls out China fills the void’ sort of thing.

I understand why people do that but I really think there’s a more interesting story here. It’s not really a response to the US. Most of the world doesn’t see great power competition everywhere.

And what I think a lot of people in the Gulf see is that the US remains their primary partner in almost every realm but China’s really important too. I think what you see countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE saying is that, look, we want to work with the US on all the important stuff and that isn’t going to change, but Washington needs to understand that China is important to us too and the stuff we do with China doesn’t necessarily compete with or overlap with the US in the way Washington does. They are just different things.

What does China see as its interests in the Middle East right now, besides oil and gas?

Oil and gas.

(Laughter)

But it’s funny because what’s overlooked a lot is that geography is really crucial right? With the BRI what they are trying to do is link these markets across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean region. The European Union is their biggest market and you’re not getting there without passing through the Middle East. And the Arabian Peninsula is a big part of that.

They’ve been developing these port projects and industrial parks up and down the coast of the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, which is another reason why Saudi Arabia is important to what China is trying to do here. The Red Sea and the Gulf creating access to the Mediterranean that way is pretty important to them.

What about naval bases?

Bases? No I don’t see that happening. These countries are US allies and partners and they know that’s a bridge too far. I don’t think Washington would be very inclined to say they would just overlook that, it’s a pretty clear red line nobody wants to cross. And for the Chinese too, what would they gain from that? They don’t have any Indian Ocean facilities yet. They’d have military facilities at the heart of Pax Americana and no connective tissue to protect it. I think China knows it has a good thing in the Gulf with the American security umbrella, so why mess with that?

OK. What else?

Islam. That doesn’t get looked at a whole lot here but the Saudi role in global Islam is very useful to China since it obviously has issues with its Muslim minorities. Having Saudi relationship supporting China when its trying to go to multilateral forums and not having a bunch of global south countries slamming them over Xinjiang.

And the Saudis and other Gulf states mostly keep their mouths shut about that.

I think there’s a few logics at play. The first is how China frames it. They say that this is a radical group based on political Islam and a separatist group trying to divide the state and when they use that language with the regimes of the Middle East it rings true. Certain governments around here can relate to it.

The other thing at play is that most countries in the region would say the Uighurs are Turkic peoples so this is Erdogan’s problem, why doesn’t he do something about it?

What about Iran, with all that’s going on there between protests and its tighter relationship with Russia and probably the end of the prospects of returning to the JCPOA?

That will be interesting to watch. Any time there’s lots of big public protests against the state it gets Chinese leaders very uncomfortable. I think the Arab spring still reverberates in Beijing. They look at it and think they aren’t very comfortable with it. So they’ll be watching Iran carefully to see how they handle it.

Beyond that, what they get from Iran remains pretty minimal. They don’t do much business, don’t buy much energy at this point. It’s mostly symbolic, a way to push back on Washington. Most of their support for Iran has been rhetorical. While they finalized this 25 year strategic partnership agreement, it’s not really worth anything yet because Chinese companies and investors aren’t going to go there as long as Iran’s under sanctions. And even if sanctions get lifted, there’s US presidential elections coming up, and if some MAGA politician wins, then they’ve seen how the sanctions just come right back.

Will China try to restrain Arab states from starting a war with Iran over the nuclear issue?

Oh totally. The main thing China wants from the Middle East is stability, the status quo. The Middle East is important to them but not that important, right? It’s not in that core interest basket. They just want it to not fall to pieces, make money through contracts, keep the energy flowing. Oh, and there’s another thing. The Chinese ambassador to the UAE gave an interview the other day and he said they are up to 400,000 people in the Emirates now.

Wow. 400K Chinese?

Yeah. It’s nuts, you’d never know it unless you’re looking for it. And that many people in one place is a vulnerability if it comes to war. Evacuating Chinese nationals from Yemen was a big problem a decade ago, in Libya there were like 35,000 to evacuate. A war that Iran’s involved with that brought the Arab Gulf states in would be a big security problem for China and its nationals.

Do you think this will come up at the summit?

Oh yeah. I think, just informally talking with officials around here, they say that whatever they talk to Chinese officials about, Iran is on the agenda even if it’s not on the agenda. They are talking about it all the time.

One last question. All these strategic partnership agreements and investments and long-term deals, to what extent has this fundamentally rewired the Gulf into Asia and China in ways that fundamentally change its place in the global political economy?

I think with Asia as a whole, that’s the more interesting story, the Asianization process. India keeps getting overlooked, India and the UAE signed this comprehensive agreement a few months ago, and India is the UAE’s number two trade partner, it’s really close to China in terms of the volume of trade. Number 3 is Japan and Korea isn’t too far off. So what you see economically is a lot of really diverse engagement with Asia as a whole, you’ve got religious connections and labor and transport hubs and more.

Security is creeping on that agenda as well. Maybe they are realizing they’ve been free riding a long time and that might change and both sides need to be ready. Korea’s got that nuclear power plant they built with the UAE. Anyway, it’s becoming really diversified. The security stuff is still very nascent but you can see it, it isn’t just about energy anymore.

Big picture, Asia-Gulf is really coalescing. China and India call it West Asia, right? I think that’s a pretty interesting reflection on where things are going. I’ve actually heard Emirati officials refer to WANA, instead of MENA, typically because they have an Asian guest in the room that they want to impress.

So this is about more than just snubbing Joe Biden then?

Yeah, you know like I’ve talked to so many reporters this week and they say my editor already has the story ready, it’s about geopolitical realignments and how Biden’s trip failed and China’s filling the void left by the United States. And I’m, like, talk to your editor, you’re getting the story wrong.

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Abu Aardvark's MENA Academy

What to expect from the China-Arab Summit